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REVIEW of U S economic developments m 1973
generally tends to focus on some of the “negative”
domestic events, such as accelerating inflation, slow-
downs in production and employment growth, and
shortages of many necessary inputs to the production
process. However, so often overlooked is this country’s
performance in the international arena. For the first
time in the past three years, our international accounts
registered surpluses or greatly reduced deficits,
This reversal resulted partly from policy actions
initiated by the United States and other industrial
countries in August and December 1971. These ac-
tions were intended to facilitate adjustments in the
then existing balance-of-payments disequilibrium. The
expected adjustment began to take hold in mid-1972,
but the speed .and m.agnitude of the adjustment in
1973 was affected by “special” factors prevailing that
year, such as a world-wide economic boom and poor
harvests in many parts of the world.
Although world-wide agricultural developments are
expected to improve and many economies are be-
ginning to show signs of slowing, 1974 is likely to be
affected by another set of “special” circumstances —
though not in the same direction. In particular, a great
deal of uncertainty exists resulting from the combined
influence of 1) cont:inued U.S. dependence on im-
ported oil. 2) uncertainty about crude oil prices in
world markets, and 3) varying rates of growth in eco-
nomic activity throughout the world,
Economic relationships between the United States
and the rest of the world have undergone an evolu-
tion during the post-World War II era. Reflecting this,
the U.S. external accounts swung from trade surpluses
in the period fronì the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, to
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trade deficits in 1971 and 1972, and finally, in 1973,
back to a surplus again. At the same time, the U.S.
dollar changed from the world’s strongest currency to
one which was subjected to massive speculation in
foreign exchange markets.
As inflationary pressures developed in the United
States in 1965 (see chart entitled “Comparative Rates
of Inflation”), the trade surplus began to diminish.
Under the prevailing regime of fixed exchange rates,
prices in the U.S. increased relative to foreign price
levels, and the demand for imports accelerated. The
relative price decrease of forcign goods in the United
States and relative price increases of U.S. goods in
foreign markets were conducive to a sharp increase in
imports as a share of U.S. gross national product and
to thc continued decline in the U.S. share of world
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exports (see chart entitled “Selected Measures of In-
ternational Trade Performance”). As private and gov-
ernment capital continued to flow out and as the trade
surplus narrowed, the basic balance deficit increased.1
In 1971 it became obvious that the disequilibrium
in the U.S. basic balance was unsustainable. As a re-
sult, confidence in the maintenance of the interna-
tional price of the dollar eroded to such an extent that
the foreign demand for dollars as an international cur-
rency declined significantly. Increasing deficits in both
the liquidity and the official settlements balances pre-
cipitated an international monetary crisis in the spring
of 1971.2 In August 1971 the United States responded
to this crisis by suspending the convertibility of offi-
cially held foreign dollars into gold, imposing a 10
percent surcharge on merchandise shipped to this
country, and letting it be known to their trading part-
T
In addition to goods, services, and unilateral transfers, the
basic balance includes long-term capital movements. Ideally,
this balance should be in equilibrium over time such that
outflows of long-term capital are offset by inflows resulting
from a trade surplus (or vice-versa). If a teniporary imbal-
ance exists, the deficit (surplus) could be financed by tem-
porary short-term capital inflows (outflows). Since 1949 the
U.S. basic balance, however, has been persistently in deficit,
which has givers rise to the accumulation of foreign owned
dollar balances. As the basic balance deficit increased in re-
cent years, the accumulation of actual dollar balances by
foreigners apparently exceeded desired dollar balances.
2
The liquidity balance, in addition to the basic balance, in-
cludes non-liquid short-term private capital and errors and
omissions. This balance is a measure of potential short-term
claims of foreigners, both private and official, against the
U.S. dollar. The official settlements balance adds changes in
liquid private capital to the liquidity balance. Thus, if private
foreigners sell short-term dollar claims to their central bank,
the official settlements deficit would exceed the liquidity
deficit by the amount of the sale.
ners that changes in the international competitive
position of the United States were necessary. Spe-
cifically, there was an expressed desire for equilibrium
in the basic balance. International negotiations and
departures from a fixed exchange rate resulted in the
depreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies
(see chart entitled “Nominal and Effective Dollar
Devaluation”).~
it seems that international trade and financial trans-
actions between the U’nited States and the rest of the
world have responded to these actions. Beginning in
mid-1972, U.S. imports from foreign countries in-
SAt the December 1971 Smithsonian Conference, new ex-
change rates were negotiated and the United States lifted
the surcharge on imports. The permissible range of exchange
rate flexibility was also widened from 1.0 percent to 2.25
percent on each side of the par value. The U.S. received
commitments from its major trading partners concerning a
reduction of trade restrictions. However, this did not result
in a calm and stable international enviromnent, and specula-
tion against the dollar continued. The following major events
transpired since December 1971: In May of 1972 the original
Common Market countries, the United Kingdom, and Den-
mark jointly agreed to a narrow range ot exchange rate
flexibility of 1½ percent among themselves while maintaining
the 2.25 percent intervention band on either side of the par
valise vis-a-vis all other currencies. In June, due to turmoil
in exchange markets, the United Kingdom and Denmark
withdrew from this arrangement and permitted their curren-
cies to float.
Selected Measures
of International Trade Performance
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creased at a lower rate, while U.S. exports to foreign
countries increased at a higher rate than in 1971. In
early 1973 the level of U.S. experts exceeded the level
of US. imports, .and a trade balance surplus of $0.7
billion was realized for the entire year.
The new set of negotiated exchange rates which
had been in effect throughout 1972 apparently did
not restore complete confidence in the international
financial system. During early 1973 international
capital movements increased to such an extent that
foreign central banks were either unwilling or unable
to support the new exchange rates. First, Italy and
Switzerland stopped supporting official exchange
rates. This had the effect of accelerating the capital
inflows into Japan and Germany.4
Finally, on February 9, foreign exchange markets
were closed. FoE owing consultations and negotiations
among several countries, the United States announced
on February 12 its decision to devalue the dollar with
respect to gold by an additional 10 percent. The
Japanese Government also decided to let the ex-
change rate for the yen be determined primarily by
market forces. When Japanese exchange markets re-
opened on February 14, the yen-dollar exchange rate
rose about 18 percent above the previously fixed rate.
These actions, however, still failed to convince for-
eign holders of dollars that equilibrium exchange rates
had been established, and m’assive conversion of dol-
lars into foreign currencies continued. On March 2
the official foreign exchange markets were closed
again and were not reopened until March 19, 1973,
During this period several European countries (Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden) decided to abandon the fixed
exchange rates between their respective currencies
and the dollar in favor of floating rates; however, due
to the strong trade ties between these countries, they
decided to maintain fixed exchange rates relative to
each other.
In this environment of flexible exchange rates, the
international price of the dollar continued to decline
until early July. At this time various central banks, in-
cluding the Federal Reserve System, indicated their
willingness to intervene in foreign exchange markets.
4
U.S. liabilities to foreign central banks increased by about
$9.0 billion between December 1973 and March 1974. Be-
tween February 1 and February 9, the German Central Bank
alone bought $6 billion.
Although the actual intervention was minimal in
amount, the international price of the dollar stabilized.
During August the dollar exchange rate began to
increase, probably prompted by the trade surplus
which had developed during the previous month.
Late in October the rate increased sharply, apparently
reflecting continued and increasing U.S. trade sur-
pluses as well as anticipations that the Middle-East
oil embargo would affect economic conditions more
adversely abroad than in the United States. In spite of
these increases in the dollar exchange rate during the
latter part of 1973, the average international price of
the dollar for 1973 was still below that of 1972. As a
result, the competitiveness of U.S. goods in world
markets continued to improve.
In addition to the dollar’s lower international price,
there were other influences which contributed to the
improved competitive position. During 1973 most
major industrial countries were in the upswing phase
of a business cycle which began in 1971; however, the
U.S. cyclical expansion began a year earlier and the
peak was reached in the first quarter of 1973 (see
chart entitled “Comparative Rates of Change in Real
Output”). Also, the .rate of inflation was greater in
most European countries and Japan. Both of these
Factors operated to increase foreign demand for U.S.
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Poor harvests in many parts of the world contrib-
uted to a large increase in the demand for U.S. agri-
cultural goods. At the same time, price controls on
some farm products tended to restrict agricultural
output in the United States. The combination of these
two influences contributed to sharply rising prices for
agricultural exports. On the import side, however, the
quantity of domestically-produced crude oil continued
to decline and U.S. oil imports increased in order to
make up the difference between domestic produc-
tion and desired domestic consumption.
As a result of these events, the U.S. trade balance,
generally considered an indicator of the U.S. compe-
titive position in international markets, was in surplus
by $0.7 billion in 1973. This followed two years of
deficits amounting to $2.7 billion in 1971 and $6.9
billion in 1972. On balance, U.S. exports in 1973 in-
creased by 44 percent over 1972. After adjusting for
higher prices, exports rose by 23 percent. Imports, on
the other hand, increased by only 5 percent in real
terms over 1972.~The goods and services balance and
5
These percentages are derived from value and quantity in-
dexes representing export and import totals for 1972 and
1973.
the current account balance in 1973 registered sur-
pluses amounting to $6.9 billion and $3 bfflion,
respectively.
U.S. Balance of Payments and Components
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The U.S. basic balance (current account plus long-
term capital), which is considered an indicator of
underlying, or long-term, trends in the U.S. interna-
tional economic position, was also in surplus by $1.2
billion. This balance has been persistently in deficit
since 1949, reaching $9.8 billion in 1972.
The deficits in both the net liquidity and the official
settlements balances ($7.8 and $5.3 billion, respec-
tively), were significantly smaller than in 1971 and
1972 (see the accompanying chart entitled “U.S. Bal-
ance of Payments and Components” and Table I).
Had it not been for large speculative dollar outflows
over the course of a few days in early 1973, even these
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Table I
U. S. BMANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1973 Net outflows of bug-term
(In Billions of Dollars) capital portfolio and direct in—
olive \‘t’stiIX’ilt ) iii 1973 amounted ~,
Not Net SI .S sillion. In 1971 and 1972
Balance Balance — these oIiUlO~VS UI1ioUTttCd to S6.~ I. Merchandise Trade; .. . , —
1. Exports - . —l 70.3 billiou III d SI i hi111011. respc~C
2. Imparts - — —— 69.6 t itely. Tue ‘.ma]I net change
Merchandise Trade Balance -‘ 0.7 — 0.7 5 St fr 1972 oecurred mauslv in
ii. Services: pri’’~Lte lcnig—hrlss capital trams—
Military Receipts -- - -- -—- 2.4 aI~tiOs IS. Direct lilt c’striient (‘X—
2. Military Payments - 4.5
3. Income on U. S Investments Abroad - t- 18.6 po’iidi [un’. h~’1. .S. corporations
4. Payments for Foreign investments in U. S. 8.8 a] 3R5i1(1 resiii Led in LII (II itflow of
5. Receipts from Travel & Transportation —‘t- 8.7 S LU billion ~ ¶973. eompared
6. Payments for Travel & Transportation - —- 11 0 to 53..! billion in 1972. An out—
7. Other Services fnotj - -r 1.0
Balance on Services -- -I— 6.2 lb i~ rh 82 hilho sit, which oc—
Goods and Services Balance - . +‘ 6.9 t-urred rlu ring tlie fl rst quarter.
IH. Transfer Payments: may hate 1 nest in anticq~ationof
1. Private -- - - 1.2 tlic tel sriulrt’ dollar devaluation.
2. Government - . - 2.6 Direct iin-c~tinunt t.~pcmsthtures
Balance an transfer Payments .. . 3.9 . -
‘ml flue I nutccl Stah s on the part
Current Account Balance - -y 3.0 of fcsrei Zl I corporations (long—
IV. Long-term Capital:
1. Direct Investment Receipts - . 1— 2.1 tCri1i capital InFIOWS ‘~ increased
2. Direct Investment Payments - — 4.9 sharply trs .82.! billion. compared
3. Portfolio Investment Receipts . j— 4.1 It .50.2 billion in 1972. \Vhile
4. Portfolio Investment Payments .. -— 0.8 .. -
5. Government Loans (net) —. 1.5 1 .S. pun-liases of Iorci~i s set ‘un—
6. Other Long-term (net) . - 0.9 ties inc-reaserl to -SOS bill ion in
Balance an Lang-term capital - 1.8 1973 conspired to 80.6 billion in
Basic Balance .. - -f 1.2 ., -
I97... I on i ~it pisn-husc’s ol ~ .S. V. Short-term Private capitol; -.
so’c-Llritlc’s clsclumsc’cl (ci .S.3.~. 1)11—
Nonliquid Liabilities •- 0.5
2. Nonliquid claim, -- -- - 4.7 lioii. c-cunsparc’d tcs 8:3.7 billion ill
Balance on Short-term Private Capital -- - 4.2 1972.
VI. Miscellaneous:
1. Allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) -
2. Errors and Omissions -- ‘ 4.8
Balance an Miscellaneous Items - . 4.8
Net Liquidity Balance - -- - --— 7.8
VII. Liquid Private Capital: A sigTnhcalst change with
- Liabilities to Foreig ners .3 4.4 respect hi 1 sng [cmi capital
2. claims on Fareigners - ... - — 1.9 transactisin.~during 1973 was the
Balance on Liquid Private Capital + 2.5 .. . . -
i ic sease in I orci ‘415 diret-I invc-st— Official Settlements Balance — - 5.3 — nsc’nts in the I. mined Static’s. It
The Official Settlements Balance is Financed by Changes in: is cliflut-islt to tlc-terinint-. hott’—
U. S. Liabilities to Foreign Official Holders: ct c’r. to what e’ctent this Was due
1. Liquid Liabilities - - -- -r 4.4 to the rc’dijctioii ii the internat—
2. Reodity Marketable Liabilities - + 1.1 . -
3. Speriat Liabilitic-s -- - - 0.5 I Ollill pta-c oi the dollar. In
Balance on Liabilities to Fareign Official Holders ± 5.1 geneS-al. isi~e would e\pect in—
U. 5. Reserve Assets: vestitieiit Litiisitsns to h’t based
1. Gold -- - - - 0.0 sin rat -cs —ret sirs i cisflsideratIons.
2. Special Drawing Rights -- - 0.0
3. Can’eertible Currencses - -— -4- 0.2 It ~ -p0 is that tin-st cou sidera—
4. IMF Gold Tranctse .. 0.0 t Ill IS tilted in favor of investing
Balence an Reserve Assets + 0.2 ii tic’ I nited States.
Total Financing of Official Settlements Balance + 5.3
merowab ,,o 5DB alloe~:’sni’,: i~15. A nuniber of factors. not all
NOTE: Fimsre~ may ,s’st add hoca scour rssunsting. 1111111ILl Iv cxcii ssiti. risay have









influenced this investment development; 1) produc-
tion costs abroad rose faster than in the United
States over a number of years (see chart entitled
“Ratio of United States Labor Costs to Selected For-
eign Countries”); 2) certain countries (Germany,
Japan) experienced labor shortages; 3) as foreign
corporations grew in size they may have decided to
diversify internationally as a hedge against domestic
uncertainty and to improve profitability; 4) an in-
creasing U.S. market share of many foreign firms may
have made it more profitable for them to service the
U.S. market from plants located within this market,
rather than by producing abroad and shipping to the
United States.
While the above factors were probably important
elements in the formation of investment decisions by
foreign corporations, it is not likely that these influ-
ences materialized suddenly in 1973. It is more
probable that the increase in foreign investment ex-
penditures in the United States was triggered by the
reduction in the international price of the dollar. This
depreciation reduced the probability of further de-
preciation and the resulting capital losses which could
be sustained by foreign investors.
The net outflow of short-term capital (nonliquid
private short-term capital, errors and omissions, and
liquid private capital)°increased during 1973 to $8.5
ONoniquid short-term private capital refers to capital inflows
or outflows (liabilities or claims) with maturities of one year
or less that are not readily transferable, such as trade financ-
billion, compared to $0.5 billion in 1972. However,
they remained well below the levels of 1970 and 1971.
The large 1973 outflows of short-term capital were
concentrated in the first quarter and were influenced
by anticipations of capital gain by switching out of
dollars into foreign currencies under the fixed ex-
change rate system that existed during this period.
After the first quarter of 1973, the incentives for
capital gains in foreign currencies were reduced by
decisions of European countries and Japan to stop
pegging their exchange rates. During the second quar-
ter, for example, the international price of the dollar
was still declining, but short-term private capital out-
flows ceased and a $1 billion in/low (including errors
and emissions) was recorded. During the third quar-
ter there was a short-term capital outflow of $0.4 bil-
lion. Reflecting the uncertainties associated with the
oil embargo, there was an inflow of $2.5 billion in the
fourth quarter.
- .~ ~ ~ )~r~~er
)1(1F4.
The most significant international development
during 1973 was the decision of many governments to
institute flexible exchange rates. The specific reasons
for resorting to floating exchange rates differed from
country to country, but in each case it was a prag-
matic solution motivated by national self-interest.
For example, in the case of Japan and Switzerland,
as well as the members of the jointly floating Euro-
pean currency block, floating resulted in an increase
in the international prices of these currencies. If the
central banks of these countries had intervened in
exchange markets in order to maintain fixed exchange
rates, they would have had to issue domestic currency
as they bought foreign currency. This would have
tended to expand their domestic money stocks, which
in turn, would have intensified their inflationary
pressures.
In the case of the United Kingdom and Italy, float-
ing of the pound and the lira resulted in a reduction
in the international prices of these currencies. If the
central banks of these countries had tried to maintain
the previously fixed exchange rates, they would have
had to sell other currencies and reduce their stocks of
international reserves. This would have tended to
contract their domestic money stocks resulting in de-
flationary consequences.
ing and cash items in the process of collection. Errors and
omissions is an adjustment entry for statistical discrepancies
and includes largely short-term capital outflows not captured
by the regular reporting channels,
Ratio of United States Labor Costs
to Selected Foreign Countries
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Throughout 1973 it became increasingly apparent
that the international monetary system had evolved
away from fixed exchange rates to a new, yet unde-
termined, payments mechanism. For many countries,
however, experience with flexible exchange rates may
strongly influence the future international monetary
system.
At one time, fixed exchange rates were deemed an
absolute necessity for a smoothly functioning inter-
national monetary system. However, as demonstrated
last year, many countries would rather permit the
international prices of their currencies to adjust to
market forces than to force the necessary adjustment
onto the domestic sector of their economies. As far as
the United States is concerned, the new floating ex-
change rate environment resulted in a depreciation of
the dollar against major foreign currencies in 1973.
There is no doubt that international trade between
the United States and the rest of the world was in-
fluenced by these new price relationships. However,
it is difficult to say with certainty whether the 1973
swing from deficit to surplus resulted mainly from the
reduction in the international price of the dollar. It is
likely that a combination of other influences were in-
strumental in determining this turnaround in the
trade balance.
Even though the U.S. economy had been in upswing
for the three years through first quarter 1973, the rate
of increase of U.S. imports declined in mid-1972. Im-
ports of manufactured goods during 1973 increased
only 2 percent in volume, compared to 13.5 percent
in 1972 and 6.5 percent in 1971.~This suggests that
the dollar devaluation, which simultaneously reduced
the foreign currency cost of U.S. exports and increased
the dollar cost of imports, had a very strong effect in
reducing U.S. demand for imports.8
The U.S. balance of payments for 1974 will be af-
fected by many events, Since about 1966 U.S. domes-
tic production of petroleum has leveled off while U.S
consumption has increased at a rapid rate (see chart
entitled ‘~United States Petroleum Supply and De-
mand”). The difference between domestic production
and consumption has been made up by increased im-
ports. In 1973, for example, U.S. consumption of petro-
leum was 17.3 million barrels per day (MBD) and
imports amounted to 6.2 MBD, 35.8 percent of
consumption.
i1i~E-~L~~
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At the same time, prices of imported oil increased
sharply. For example, the average price per barrel of
imported oil was $2.75 in January 1973 and climbed
to $11 in March 1974. U.S. expenditures for imports
of petroleum and petroleum products climbed from
$4.6 billion in 1972 to $8 billion in 1973.°Many pro-
jections for 1974 indicate that U.S. expenditures for
oil imports will rise to about $25 billion.1°This would
imply a trade deficit for the United States in 1974,
and indeed, preliminary first quarter trade data lend
support to this conjecture.
Moreover, sharply increased expenditures for oil
imports are projected for other industrial countries.
The oil-exporting countries will therefore gain in-
creased revenues, and these revenues will have to he
disposed of one way or another. That is, they must
either import more goods and services or invest their
oil earnings in foreign assets.
9See Survey of Current Business (March 1974), p. 38.
10See, for example, the International Economic Report of the
President (March 1974), p. 107.
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7
Council on International Economic Policy, International Eco-
nomic Report of the President, 1974, p. 32, and U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports.
8In an analysis of U.S. trade performance in 1972, William
Fellner suggested that in a period of cyclical upswing the
ratio of the U.S. import growth rate to the export growth rate
should increase in comparison to a previous time period
(1984-1971). Since such an increase in the ratio was not ob-
served, Fellner reasons that the reduction in the international
price of the dollar exerted a strong influence during 1972.
See William Fellner, “Controlled Floating and the Confused
Issue of Money illusion,” American Enterprise Institute
(Febmary 1974).




































It is likely that oil-producing countries wifi not make
completely offsetting purchases of imports from the
industrial countries. Thus, oil-producing countries will
seek investment opportunities in the industrialized
countries. It is also likely that the flow of these invest-
ment funds to the United States will be greater than
U.S. expenditures for oil imports. In this situation the
U.S. trade balance may be in deficit, but the other
international accounts of the United States may not
be affected adversely.
Although US. short-term interest rates have in-
creased since late February, the U.S. rates are still
below those in most major foreign countries (see chart
entitled “Selected Short-Tenn Money Market Rates”).
If this differential is maintained, it may stimulate out-
flows of dollars into foreign money markets, thus lead-
ing to an increase in the quantity of dollars supplied.
This would exert pressure toward a decline in the in-
ternational price of the dollar.
Persistent acceleration of U.S. consumer price in-
creases may be perceived by private international
holders of dollar assets as an indication that the rate
of inflation is likely to continue rather than to abate.
Such anticipation may motivate an attempt to switch-
out of dollars into real assets- The recent surge in the
price of gold would support this explanation.
On January 23 the United States suspended con-
trols on foreign lending by U.S. financial institutions,
and foreign investment by U.S. corporations. In addi-
tion, the Interest Equalization Tax was removed.
This may again work toward future increases in the
quantity of dollars supplied to foreign exchange mar-
kets. In short, although the dollar depreciation and
emerging oil problems should increase the quantity of
dollars demanded in international markets, differences
in interest rates and rates of inflation, as well as the
relaxation of U.S. capital controls may work toward
an increase in dollars supplied to foreign markets.
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